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WORKING TOWARD EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
The democratic principle upon which this nation was founded should not
be restricted to the oliticalprocess but should be applied to the industrial
operations as well.
INTRODUCTION
Concentrated power is a threat to democracy.2 One of the basic
tenets of democracy is "majority rule."3 When power becomes central-
ized in the hands of the few, the few are tempted to lord it over the
many, and the aim of democracy is thwarted. The system of checks
and balances in the United States Constitution guards against concen-
trations of political power.4 But power takes on other forms, one of
which is capital. Extreme concentrations of capital are prevalent in
American society. A 1976 study of the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress found that the wealthiest one percent of the United States
population owned nearly twenty-six percent of the country's total net
worth.5 This one percent of the population owned more than half of all
corporate stock as well as more than half of all outstanding debt.6 Half
of this small group, just over one million people, owned fifty percent of
the nation's total outstanding corporate stock in 1972.7
The closest reservoir of capital to the average American is the com-
pany for which he works. Employee ownership of businesses and cor-
porations allows for a more equitable distribution of capital by
I. Albert Gallatin, former Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Jefferson and Madison.
As reported by the Council of Profit Sharing Industries from the personal papers of Albert
Gallatin in PROFIT SHARING TRENDS, May-April 1959, at 3 (a publication of the Council of
Profit Sharing Industries). Albert Gallatin is said to be the father of profit sharing in
America. The profit sharing plan he instituted in his glass works in 1794 is set out, id. at 24-
25.
2. The United States Government and traditional American political theory generally disfavor
concentrations of political or economic power. For example, the Homestead Act equitably
distributed the western lands, guarding against the possibility of wealthy land barons buying
all the land. Antitrust laws ensure that corporations do not monopolize the market or com-
bine to restrain trade.
Ronald Reagan while campaigning for President of the United States stated:
Our Founding Fathers well understood that concentrated power is the enemy of lib-
erty and the rights of man. They knew that the American experiment in individual
liberty, free enterprise, and republican self-government could succeed only if power
were widely distributed. And since in any society social and the political power flow
from economic power, they saw that wealth and property would have to be widely
distributed among the people of this country.
Letter from Ronald Reagan to the New Orleans Times-Picayune (October 31, 1980).
3. ARISTOLE, 3 POLITICS ch. 8, 1279(b) (20-21).
4. STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 363-80 (3d ed.
Boston 1858).
5. Joint Economic Committee, 94th CONG. 2D SESS., BROADENING THE OWNERSHIP OF NEW
CAPITAL: ESOPs AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 7, table I-Personal Wealth 1972 (Comm. Print
1976).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 13.
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allowing the ultimate producers of capital, the workers, a "piece of the
action."
Employee ownership in its various forms is quickly gaining popu-
larity nationwide. 8 This surge of interest in employee ownership stems
more from pragmatic rather than idealistic concerns. While some em-
ployee-ownership advocates hope to effect a redistribution of national
wealth, more often employee ownership is the only means by which
workers can keep their jobs in the face of potential plant shut-downs.9
Government officials view employee ownership as a means through
which local communities can maintain their tax base and avoid the
fiscal burdens of large-scale unemployment that follow in the wake of
plant closings.'° Members of business and managerial communities re-
gard employee ownership as an opportunity to simultaneously raise
productivity, undermine labor's efforts to unionize, and put a lid on
wage and benefit increases."
Whatever the origins of the trend towards employee ownership, the
results, though mixed, are chiefly positive. Approximately 1,000 to
3,000 employee stock ownership plans (ESOP's) are in effect in the
United States today, most of which provide employees with only a mi-
nority of stock in their company.' 2 Of these companies owned by both
management and labor, employees in more than ninety companies own
a majority of the assets. 13 These companies range in size from several
8. See generally Quiet Revolution, ECONOMIST, March 13, 1982, at 24.
9. See generally D. ZWERDLING, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 53-79 (1980). This book contains a
study of the Vermont Asbestos Group, probably the most widely publicized example of
workers successfully using employee ownership to save their jobs after being threatened with
a plant closing. Other examples discussed include Saratoga Knitting Mills, Mohawk Valley
Community Corporation, and South Bend Lathe. An account of the South Bend Lathe take-
over is contained in Ross, What Happens When the Employees Buy the Company, FORTUNE,
June 2, 1980, at 108.
Other recently publicized employee takeovers spurred on by threatened plant closings
include the Rath Packing Company, see generally Foote, When Employees Take Over (the
Rath Packing Company), NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1981, at 74; the Republic Hose Manufacturing
Corporation, see generally Buying Jobs: Republic Hose Corporation, Formerly Aeroquip,
TIME, Dec. 24, 1979, at 65; and, more recently the Weirton Works of the National Steel
Corporation, see N.Y. Times, March 14, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Not only unprofitable firms are
shut down. Sometimes a conglomerate closes a profitable subsidiary simply because it fails
to meet a certain target rate of return on investment capital. Sperry Rand Corporation, for
example, opted to close its library furniture plant in Herkimer, New York because it failed to
meet its quota 22% rate of return. The Herkimer plant had shown a profit for all but one of
the previous 20 years. See Bluestone and Harrison, Why Corporations Close Profitable
Plants, WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY, May-June 1980, at 15-23.
10. See generally Zwerdling, Workplace Democracy.- 4 Strategyfor Survival, PROGRESSIVE, Au-
gust 1978, at 16; Blasi and Whyte, Worker Ownership and Public Policy, POLICY STUDIES
JOURNAL, Dec. 1981, at 320; Toscano, Employee Ownership and Democracy in the Workplace,
SOCIAL POLICY, May-June 1981, at 16.
11. M. CARNOY AND D. SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1980s
135-43 (1980).
12. M. CONTE, A. TANNENBAUM, AND D. MCCULLOCH, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 2 (1981) (done
by the Survey Research Center Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan
and presented to the Economic Development Administration of the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESSES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS 2
(Comm. Print 1980).
13. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, supra
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employees to several thousand.14 In 1981, the University of Michigan
Survey Research Center published a study of ninety-eight employee-
owned firms for the Economic Development Administration. 15 Of the
thirty firms making data available, profits were one and a half times
higher in employee-owned firms than non-employee-owned firms.1 6
The Survey Research Center found that as employees' equity owner-
ship increased, profits also increased." Managers who were surveyed
in the study reported much higher levels of employee satisfaction with
employee ownership compared to the previous conventional ownership
of their companies.' 8 The managers also contended that employee
ownership improved both productivity and workers' attitudes toward
management and toward their jobs.' 9
This note will discuss the three forms of employee ownership prom-
inent in the United States, as well as current state and federal legisla-
tion. Additionally, this note proposes ideas for future employee
ownership legislation.
THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
There are three principal types of employee-owned companies in
the United States: the direct worker ownership firm (the "mock con-
ventional" firm), the producer cooperative, and the employee stock
ownership plan firm (the ESOP firm).2"
DIRECT WORKER OWNERSHIP
The direct worker ownership firm is clearly the simplest arrange-
ment of the three forms of employee ownership. When economic fac-
tors force a company to consider closing or relocating, the workers
form an organization to sell stock in a new company which will buy the
old plant from its previous owner, sometimes in cooperation with local
government. 2 1 Thus, the workers own the stock "directly" rather than
"beneficially," as through stock deposited in the workers' names as
note 12, at 1, 24-6. This figure does not include companies owned only by management
employees.
14. Id. at I.
15. CONTE, TANNENBAUM and MCCULLOCH, supra note 12.
16. Id. at 23.
17. Id. at 25.
18. Id. at 30, 33 (table 15). The study found that in employee-owned firms, workers' attitudes
toward both management and their jobs improved. Regarding workers' attitudes toward
management, the study found that workers and management reported that they worked bet-
ter together and improved communication and relations resulted. Concerning workers' atti-
tudes toward their jobs, the study found that workers and management reported that workers
were more conscientious, determined, and self-fulfilled. Id. at 48 (tables 5, 6), 51 (tables 7,
8).
19. Id. at 36, 37 (table 17), 48 (tables 5, 6), 51 (tables 7, 8).
20. See THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS,
supra note 12, at 4-14; Toscano, supra note 10, at 16-21; C. ROSEN, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP:
ISSUES, RESOURCES AND LEGISLATION 8-18 (1982).
21. Toscano, supra note 10, at 17-18; ROSEN, supra note 20, at 18; THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, supra note 12, at 13-14.
1984]
Journal of Legislation
beneficiaries of a trust. To help raise the necessary capital, the stock
offering generally is not limited to employees.22
Employees or employee-community groups directly own about one-
quarter of the employee-owned firms in the United States.23 A direct
worker ownership firm, once established, differs little from the conven-
tional enterprise that preceded it (thus the term "mock conventional"),
except that workers hold a larger amount of shares in the company
than workers generally own, and they own these shares in conjunction
with other outside investors. Generally though, operations and struc-
ture of the company remain unaltered.24
Direct employee ownership has certain drawbacks. For instance,
the workers seldom sit on the board of directors nor participate in com-
pany management, but like other stock owners, they have voting privi-
leges. Additionally, workers frequently fail to plan for the transfer of
stock from retiring employees. Consequently, outside investors in-
crease their percentage stock holdings, and the plant soon returns to its
pre-employee-owned organization.25  Thus, although the workers ini-
tially purchase the company because only they are willing to put up the
necessary capital and take the risk, they slowly lose their ownership
control because their interest is not reflected in the company's manage-
rial structure.
The Vermont Asbestos Group (VAG) exemplifies a successful com-
pany owned directly by its employees, but whose employees are not
adequately represented in management.26 In January 1974, the GAF
Corporation announced it would close its small asbestos mine and
plant in northern Vermont. 27 The workers and townspeople formed
VAG, sold stock, and obtained a bank loan guaranteed by the State of
Vermont to purchase the mine and plant.28 They completed the
purchase in March, 1975. The employees, including both management
22. Toscano, supra note 10, at 17; THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, supra note 12, at 13. Raising the necessary capital may be ex-
tremely difficult. Employees may need to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars in as little
as a few months or a few weeks. Banks are often unwilling to loan money because this
endeavour is filled with uncertainty. See, for example, the problems of the Mohawk Valley
Community Corporation in purchasing the Sperry Rand library furniture factory in
Herkimer, New York. Faced with a shut-down, the workers and other members of the com-
munity formed the Mohawk Valley Community Corporation which then needed to raise
$1,800,000 in 90 days. ZWERDLING, supra note 9, at 75-9.
23. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, supra
note 12, at 13.
24. Toscano, supra note 10, at 17. See also THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EM-
PLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, supra note 12, at 13. The experience of the asbestos min-
ers at the Vermont Asbestos Group in Lowell, Vermont is a good example of direct
ownership and also demonstrates the deficiencies of this type of employee ownership.
ZWERDLING, supra note 9, at 53-63.
25. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, supra
note 12, at 14.
26. ZWERDLING, supra note 9, at 53-63.
27. Id. at 54.
28. Id. at 56-57.
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and labor, managed to retain seventy-eight percent of the stock.29
The shareholders of VAG, including the employees, elect a fifteen
member board of directors which votes on general policies and any
corporate expenditures exceeding $7,000.30 Nevertheless, a five-mem-
ber executive board, essentially the same management that operated
the firm under GAF Corporation, makes most of the important deci-
sions.' The board of directors and the executive board are no more
responsive to workers' demands than the previous management.32 Al-
though VAG has profitted, the workers are disillusioned. They no
longer control the company they purchased to save from closing.3 3
PRODUCER COOPERATIVES
Workers facing a plant closing often establish a second form of em-
ployee ownership called "producer cooperatives" or "worker coopera-
tives".34 Although there is no reliable figure for the number of
producer cooperatives in the United States, sources estimate that at
least several thousand currently exist.35 Producer cooperatives vary in
form, but most cooperatives are small retail businesses such as baker-
ies, bookstores, and restaurants.36 Yet, there have been a number of
successful industrial cooperatives, the best known and most prosperous
of which are the plywood cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest.
3 7
Traditionally only the workers in an American producer coopera-
tive can become members and each member buys one share or pays a
membership fee.38 Unlike a conventional corporation in which owner-
ship is determined by the amount of stock held, a cooperative distrib-
utes ownership equally among its members.39 In theory, each worker is
entitled to an equal share of annual total earnings.40 Workers receive
an advance on their share of the total earnings as their wage.4 1 The
cooperative actually reinvests any earnings in excess of costs, or alter-
natively, allocates the money to member shareholders as a "patronage
29. Id. at 57.
30. Id. at 58.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Toscano, supra note 10, at 20-1.
35. See THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS,
supra note 12, at 10; Rosen, supra note 20, at 15.
36. 4 Survey of U.S. Producer Cooperatives: Summary of the Initial Phase. Hearings on the Small
Business Employee Ownership Act Before the Select Committee on Small Business, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 536 (1979) (report by Joyce Crain of the Center for Economic Studies); Rosen, supra
note 18, at 16.
37. See generally K. BERMAN, WORKER OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES (1967).
38. Rosen, supra note 20, at 16; Carnoy and Shearer, supra note 9, at 183-94; R. OAKESHOTT,
THE CASE FOR WORKER Co-ops 229 (1978); 1. PACKEL, THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERA-
TION OF COOPERATIVES 92 (1970).
39. Packel, supra note 38, at 87-115.
40. Id. at 187.
41. Rosen, supra note 20, at 16.
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dividend. '4 2 The shareholders' receipts are not taxable to the coopera-
tive; thus, the cooperative avoids corporate "double taxation." 3 The
government allows this special tax advantage because cooperatives are
not designed to make a "profit." Instead of generating a profit, pro-
ducer cooperatives grant their members a return on their investment of
capital and labor." In conventional corporations profits are the excess
of receipts over expenses. A producer cooperative uses its excess re-
ceipts to equally benefit each of its members, or as patronage divi-
dends, whereas conventional corporations allow management to invest
profits as it sees fit.4 5
Each member of a producer cooperative has one vote. The mem-
bers, as owners and workers, select the cooperative's management.
Generally, the power to select management is delegated to an elected
board of directors.' The board of directors embodies the democratic
control of the cooperative. 7 The members can remove a director for
cause after notice and a hearing. 8 Some cooperatives provide for the
initiative, which allows a fixed percentage of the membership to compel
consideration of a proposal at a regular or special meeting. If adopted,
the proposal becomes effective irrespective of any decision by the board
of directors.49
Producer cooperatives almost always limit the transferability of
their shares. Usually shareholders must first offer their shares to the
cooperative at par or cost. This restraint is important because it allows
the cooperative to bar persons with antagonistic interests from
membership.50
The plywood cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest are the most
successful producer cooperatives in the United States. The first ply-
wood cooperative, Olympic Veneer, was formed in 1921 by a group of
125 lumberworkers, carpenters and mechanics.5 Olympic Veneer's
success inspired the formation of thirty other plywood cooperatives. 52
Although the precise structure changes from one cooperative to the
next, the basic principles remain the same. Each worker owns one
share and casts one vote in elections. The workers elect the board of
directors (usually seven to nine people from inside the mill) and also
42. Id.
43. I.R.C. §§ 1381-3 (CCH 1983). Briefly, these "patronage dividends" (generally allotted to
members based on the number of hours worked) are deducted by the worker cooperatives
from corporate taxable income. "Patronage dividends" may be either cash or a credit to
members' individual capital accounts. Thus, cooperatives are able to avoid double taxation
as well as retain and reinvest a portion of the earnings allocated to members.
44. Rosen, supra note 20, at 16.
45. Packel, supra note 38, at 186.
46. Id. at 106-15.
47. Id. at 112.
48. Id. at 115-16.
49. Id. at 116-17.
50. Id. at 97-102.
51. ZWERDLING, supra note 9, at 95-6.
52. Id.
[Vol. 11:127
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vote on company policies, including purchases and investments, at
company meetings at least twice a year. ' Also, every worker, from the
janitor to the president of the cooperative, earns equal pay. 4
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
Employee stock ownership plans (ESOP's), the third form of em-
ployee ownership, is by far the most popular. Workers can use an
ESOP as a means to buy out their company or to establish an employee
benefit plan for an existing company." While ESOP's have existed
since the 1950's, they have only gained popularity since the mid-1970's.
A series of laws clarifying and expanding the tax benefits available to
such plans largely contributed to their increased popularity. 6
Under an ESOP a company sets up an Employee Stock Ownership
Trust (ESOT) to arrange a loan from a bank or other credit source. 8
Creditors generally demand that the company fully guarantee any bor-
rowing done by the ESOT.59 The trust then uses its borrowed funds to
buy company stock on behalf of the employees, the beneficiaries of the
trust. The stock remains in the trust as collateral, and the company
agrees to repay the tax-deductible principal and interest on the loan.6°
The company may deduct the payments on both the interest and
principal of the loan to the ESOT.6' The company benefits from this
arrangement because generally only interest is tax-deductible.62 The
employees also benefit because the stock "vests" in them as the loan is
repaid.63 "Vesting" is a process, beginning a few years after a loan is
53. Id. at 96-7.
54. Id. at 96.
55. CONTE, TANNEBAUM and MCCULLOCH, supra note 12, at 7; THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, supra note 12, at 3.
56. Marsh and McAllister, ESOPs Tables. A Survey of Companies with Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans, THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW, SPRING 1981, no. 3, at 558-63.
57. Under the Internal Revenue Code all Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP's) belong to
the defined contribution category of deferred compensation plans. I.R.C. § 414(i) (CCH
1983). Defined contribution plans must provide that the sponsoring employee establish a
trust to receive the employer's contribution to the plan. Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 403(a), 88 Stat. 829, 876 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a) (1976)) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
58. See generally EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS 43
(Reichter ed. 1977).
59. The employer normally guarantees contributions to the ESOT in an amount that wiln ensure
the trust meets loan installments as they come due. See generally EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNER-
SHIP PLANS 231-57 (J. Bachelder ed. 1979).
60. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (c) (1977).
61. The amount deductible of the principal, however, may not exceed 25% of the compensation
otherwise paid or accrued during the taxable year to the employees under such employee
stock ownership plans. I.R.C. § 404(a)(10) (CCH 1983) (added by Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 333(a) applicable to tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1981).
62. I.R.C. § 163 (CCH 1983).
63. Stock usually vests with employees according to a "vesting schedule." Typically, an em-
ployee will be 30% vested after three years, 40% vested after four years, etc., up to the tenth
year, after which the employee will be 100% vested, that is, fully entitled to the stock which
has accumulated in the account over the years. See Rosen, supra note 20, at 11. As the loan
is repaid, the shares are allocated to the individual accounts of the participants. See Treas.
Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8) (1977).
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made, which entitles the employees to receive a distribution of the
stock held for their benefit in the trust.64 Thus, ownership of the com-
pany is slowly transferred to the employees.
While the stock is held in trust any dividends received can be either
retained or passed through to the employees. The Internal Revenue
Code requires that voting rights on publicly traded shares must be
passed through to individual employees.65 For non-publicly traded
shares, the vote need only pass through to employees for major corpo-
rate issues such as mergers or dissolution, which require a greater than
majority vote by law or corporate charter.66 Alternatively, companies
may choose to pass voting rights to the individuals on all issues, thus
giving workers greater democratic control.
An employee who leaves a company that has established an ESOT
is entitled to the vested portion of his individual account. Although the
employee has a right to receive the actual shares, a distribution of the
fair market value of the shares is generally preferred. By distributing
the fair market value of the shares, the company's stock, and thus the
company ownership, remains with the current employees. 67
Workers at South Bend Lathe in South Bend, Indiana used an
ESOP to purchase their business from Amsted Industries of Chicago in
1975.68 Federal and private loans financed the $9.6 million purchase.
Although South Bend Lathe suffered heavy losses during its last five
years under Amsted, it prospered under employee ownership.
Throughout the first four years under employee ownership, sales in-
creased fifty-three percent, after-tax profits quintupled, and productiv-
ity rose six to twelve percent a year.69
At South Bend Lathe, the stock vests with workers according to a
formula based on compensation and length of service. Eventually the
employees will own all the stock. Until then, workers vote only the
minority of stock with which they are vested, and the trust votes the
majority.7" Management and labor relations have changed little since
the buy-out, primarily because no changes were ever considered by the
employees. Assumably, changes will follow once a majority of the
stock is fully vested with the employees and the employees assert their
ownership rights. In any case, South Bend Lathe proves that employee
ownership can work.
64. See Marsh and McAllister, supra note 56, at 594-5, (table 9); CONTE, TANNENBAUM and
MCCULLOCH, supra note 12, at 8, (table 1).
65. I.R.C. § 409A(e) (2) (CCH 1983).
66. Id. § 409A(e) (3).
67. Rosen, supra note 20, at 12. See also EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS, supra note 59, at
45.
68. Ross, What Happens When the Employees Buy the Company, FORTUNE, June 2, 1980, at 109.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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EXISTING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP LEGISLATION
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
In recent years the Federal Government has enacted numerous laws
supporting employee ownership through government loans and tax in-
centives. The most notable of these laws are briefly summarized here.
The primary tax benefit accorded ESOP's by the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) is their status as a qualified employee benefit plan empow-
ered to borrow funds.7 "Qualified" means that all contributions to the
plan are tax deductible and comply with all the requirements of the
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA).72 Only since
Congress adopted ERISA in 1974 have ESOP's been recognized as a
distinct type of benefit plan.73 Employee benefits are taxed only when
the employee actually removes stock from the plan.74 An ESOP, how-
ever, is a specialized type of bonus plan in that it must invest its assets
primarily in employee securities. 75 Thus, the IRC allows an ESOP the
unique opportunity to borrow funds through a trust and, in effect, have
both the principal and the interest of the loan treated as taxdeductible. 6
Another law supporting ESOP's is the Tax Reduction Act of 1975
which added a one percent investment tax credit for any company set-
ting up a qualified ESOP. 77 To qualify for the tax credit, the ESOP
had to distribute stock according to each employee's salary (ignoring
amounts over $100,000); stock voting rights had to be passed through to
71. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (CCH 1983). An employee stock ownership plan specifically designed to
borrow money from lending institutions to fund the employee stock ownership trust is a
"leveraged ESOP." Although loan guarantees from a sponsor of a deferred compensation
plan are generally prohibited transactions, id. § 4975(c)(1)(B), leveraged ESOP's are ex-
empted from this prohibition, id § 4975(d)(3).
72. Id. § 401(a).
73. ERISA, supra note 57, § 406(d)(6)(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)) (1976). Generally,
an employer contributing to an employee stock ownership plan may claim a federal income
tax deduction equal to the amount contributed but not to exceed 15% of the compensation
paid to the participants in the plan for the year, I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (CCH 1983) ("compen-
sation" as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-9(b) (1956).
74. An employee may exclude from his gross income contributions made by an employer to a
deferred employee compensation plan. I.R.C. § 402(a) (CCH 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-
l(a) (1956). All employee stock ownership plans belong to the defined contribution category
of deferred compensation plans, I.R.C. § 414(i) (CCH 1983). In general, any contributions
made by an employee to the employee stock ownership plan which is returned to him in a
lump sum distribution is not subject to taxation, id § 402(e)(4)(D)(i). Any remainder of the
lump sum distribution that is in the form of employer stock is included in the employee's
gross income at the lesser of the original cost of the shares or the market value of the shares
at the time of the distribution, id § 402(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(iii), -l(b)(l)(i), -
l(b)(2)(i) (1956). If the distribution does not qualify as a lump sum distribution, the portion
of the contributions made by the employer will be taxed at ordinary income tax rates, the
value determined by the fair market value of the stock at the time of the distribution. I.R.C.
§ 402(a)(1) (CCH 1983), Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-I(a)(iii) (1956).
75. ERISA, supra note 57, § 407(d)(6)A (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)) (1976), I.R.C.
§ 409A(a)(2) (CCH 1983)).
76. See supra note 61.
77. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
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the employees; and vesting had to be immediate. 78  A one percent
credit meant that, by establishing an ESOP, a company making invest-
ments which qualify under the investments credit provisions could re-
ceive a return of 1% of the cost of the investment from the government.
Essentially, the government contributes to the ESOP. In 1976, Con-
gress extended availability of this credit until January 1, 1981, and in-
creased the credit to 1.5%, provided that the employees also contributed
.5%. If the employees do not contribute .5%, the one percent credit was
applied.79 In 1978, the credit was further extended through 1983.80
Producer cooperatives receive certain tax advantages as well. When
cooperatives return net earnings, or "patronage dividends," to their
members, only the members-not the business-incur tax liability on
the earnings. 8' Cooperatives receive tax treatment similar to a Sub-
chapter S corporation.82
In addition to tax advantages, some federally-financed loans and
loan guarantees are also available to employee-owned companies and
companies attempting to become employee-owned. There are five
principal potential sources for these loans.
First, Title V of the 1980 Small Business Development Act autho-
rizes the Small Business Administration to make loan guarantees either
to employees seeking to buy-out their companies or to companies with
established employee ownership plans.8 3 These loan guarantees are
available only to small businesses, generally those with 500 or fewer
employees, and have a loan guarantee limit of $500,000.84
78. Id. § 301(d)(2) (codified in sections of 26 U.S.C.).
79. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 803(d), 90 Stat. 1520, 2587-8 (1976) (amend-
ing § 301 of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975).
80. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 141, 92 Stat. 2763, 2787-96 (1978) (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 26 and 29 U.S.C. 1981).
81. I.R.C. § 1382 (CCH 1983).
82. Rosen, supra note 20, at 23. Section 1361 of the Internal Revenue Code (1983) allows a
qualified entity to elect status as a Subchapter S Corporation thereby receiving preferential
tax treatment.
83. Title V of the 1980 Small Business Development Act, Pub. L. No. 96-302, 94 Stat. 833, 850-
54 (1980) (This title may be cited as the Small Business Employee Ownership Act of 1980).
The second section of Title V reads:
Sec. 502. The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) employee ownership of firms provides a means for preserving jobs and business
activity;
(2) employee ownership of firms provides a means for keeping a small business
small when it might otherwise be sold to a conglomerate or other large
enterprise;
(3) employee ownership of firms provides a means for creating a new small business
from the sale of a subsidiary of a large enterprise;
(4) unemployment insurance programs, welfare payments, and job creation pro-
grams are less desirable and most costly for both the Government and program
beneficiaries then loan guarantee programs to maintain employment in firms
that would otherwise be closed, liquidated, or relocated; and
(5) by guaranteeing loans to qualified employee trusts and similar employee organi-
zations, the Small Business Administration can provide feasible and desirable
methods for the transfer of all or part of the ownership of a small business con-
cern to its employees.
84. Small Business Act of 1953, § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), as amended
[Vol. 11: 127
Employee Ownership
Second, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) has es-
tablished its own policy to assist employee buy-outs.8 5 The EDA can
make direct loans or loan guarantees to employees seeking to buy a
firm that might otherwise close.86 Additionally, the EDA can make a
grant to a community development agency which can, in turn, loan the
money to the employees at a low interest rate.87 The EDA provides
assistance only in areas meeting certain unemployment or poverty
levels; 8 however, EDA assistance has no statutory dollar limitation. 89
Third, the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, which provides aid for
urban development in certain distressed areas, allows for grants to sup-
port employee ownership.9" The grants are made directly to city gov-
ernments which then loan the money to an employee organization to
purchase the company. Presently, the UDAG program has been used
to support employee ownership only once. 91
Fourth, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) also supports
employee ownership. The FmHA may make loans to advance em-
ployee ownership both in plant buy-outs, and in ongoing employee
ownership plans.92 These loans have no dollar limitations but are re-
stricted to non-metropolitan cities with fewer than 50,000 people.93
Finally, the National Consumer Cooperative Bank, created by Con-
gress, may allocate up to ten percent of its resources to loans for worker
cooperatives. 94 These funds, which may amount to $30 million annu-
ally sometime in the near future, are allocated mostly through small
loans.95 The Cooperative Bank can also provide technical assistance in
the form of management training sessions, seminars, and an analysis of
by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, § 1902, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95
Stat.) 357.
85. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS, Supra
note 12, at 16-17; Rosen, supra note 20, at 24.
86. Although such loans are not statutorily mandated, they are authorized by the Public Works
and Economic Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3171 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Although not statutorily mandated, these grants in support of employee ownership are statu-
torily authorized by Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) as amended by Title I of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1977, § 110, 42 U.S.C. 5304 (1976 & Supp. 1981), and as
amended by Title I of the Housing and Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, 94
Stat. 1614 (codified at various sections of 12, 13, 15, 42 U.S.C. (1981)). See also the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1981, U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357.
91. An Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) was used to help finance the Hyatt-Clark
Corporation buy-out. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1981, at 34, col. 6.
92. Although such loans are not statutorily mandated, they are authorized by the Consolidated
Farm and Rural Development Act, § 310B, 7 U.S.C. § 1932 (1982).
93. See 7 C.F.R. § 1980.401-.495 (1983). See generally Farmer's Home Administration Instruc-
tions 1980-E § 1980.45 (telephone interview with representative of FmHA).
94. National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3018 (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
as amended by Title III of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, U.S. CODE &
AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357.
95. Rosen, supra note 20, at 25.
1984]
Journal of Legislation
the cooperative's program and its needs.96 The Cooperative Bank was
founded on the premise that the United States Treasury Department
would provide the initial capital, but the Bank eventually would be-
come entirely private. The Bank received federal funding in 1981 and
became private in 1982.97 The Bank has significantly less capital now
than it would have had if government funding had been continued. 98
STATE GOVERNMENTS
Because of their close relationship with businesses within their bor-
ders and their awareness of these businesses' special needs, various
states have given more creative and substantial support to employee
ownership. Following are some examples of typical current state em-
ployee ownership legislation. These statutes indicate that states have
responded favorably to the growing number of employee-owned busi-
nesses, and they may provide other state legislators with ideas for simi-
lar legislation in their own states.
Maryland
The State of Maryland has passed four laws in support of employee
ownership. The Maryland Broadened Ownership Act of 1980 provides:
It is the policy of this state. . . that broadening the ownership of capi-
tal should be a twin pillar of economic policy, along with achieving full
employment. The General Assembly of Maryland finds that Employee
Stock Ownership Plans ... make an important contribution toward
the broadening of capital ownership, increase the income and financial
security of citizens of the State, assure citizens greater control over
their economic futures, improve productivity and labor-management
relations, contribute to the national effort to combat inflation,
strengthen the free enterprise system, and put the state in the forefront
of contemporary economic trends. It is the policy of this State to en-
courage the broadening of the base of capital ownership among wider
numbers of Maryland citizens, and to encourage the use of Employee
Stock Ownership Plans as one means of broadening the ownership of
capital.99
The Act requires several state agencies (including the Division of Eco-
nomic Development of the Department of Economic and Community
Development, the Maryland Industrial Financing Authority, and
others) to annually report their efforts to promote these policies.
This Maryland statute reflects what many states believe are the ben-
efits to the state from employee ownership: citizens with greater eco-
96. See Title II of the National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3044-3048 (1976
& Supp. V 1981), as amended by Title III of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357.
97. See N.Y. Times, June 27, 1982, at C9, col. 1.
98. Id.
99. Maryland Broadened Ownership Act, 1980 Md. Laws 821 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
41, § 14J (1957).
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nomic control, improved productivity, better labor-management
relations, and a strengthening of the free enterprise system. All of these
goals are likely to follow from employee ownership."0 Unfortunately,
this statute only specifically endorses ESOP's. While ESOP's are an
important part of employee ownership, cooperatives achieve these
goals and also allow for greater democratic control of the business.
Maryland adopted a second act in 1980 which provides that em-
ployees receive notice of take-over efforts made to the management,
and that options under employee ownership plans be explained to em-
ployees.'' The law requires employers to post a notice informing em-
ployees of the possibility of an ESOP and giving them the address of a
local government official who will provide free information. This "pre-
notification" statute avoids forcing employees into a hurried decision
upon a suddenly-announced plant closing and gives them time to con-
sider whether they want to buy their plant. Also, workers are often not
aware that they can buy their company. Thus, this statute ensures that
the employees will receive necessary information early enough to allow
them to make an intelligent decision.
The third act adopted by the General Assembly of Maryland recog-
nized that in certain states public utility regulatory agencies have taken
actions to deter public utility companies from establishing ESOP's. To
prevent this result in Maryland, the state legislature passed an act in
1980 prohibiting the Public Service Commission from discouraging the
use of ESOP's in public utilities. 0 2
A fourth act adopted by the General Assembly of Maryland in 1980
exempts any sale of securities to an ESOT from state securities regula-
tions requiring a prospectus to be filed with the state Securities Ex-
change Commission.' Stock registration and filing requirements
entail costly and time-consuming procedures which may hinder an
ESOP, and they provide unnecessary safeguards in the sale of stock to
an ESOT.
California
Similar to the Maryland ESOP securities exemption, California leg-
islation enacted in 1982 provides that offers or sales of securities to em-
ployee stock ownership plans are exempt from certain qualification
requirements of the state's Corporate Securities Law of 1968. " This
act also creates a state policy supporting employee stock ownership
plans, and incorporates much of the language of the Maryland Broad-
100. CONTE, TANNENBAUM and MCCULLOCH, supra note 12.
101. 1980 Md. Laws 119 (codified at MD. CoRPs. & AsS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-902(b)(9) (Supp.
1983)).
102. 1980 Md. Laws 847 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 78 § 69(d) (1980)).
103. 1980 Md. Laws 598 (codified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(14) (Supp.
1983)). See also MD. CORPS. & AsS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-205, 11-501, 11-602 (Supp. 1983).
104. 1982 Cal. Stat. chapter 1524 (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(M) (West Supp. 1983)).
19841
Journal of Legislation
ened Ownership Act of 1980.105
Delaware
Delaware has adopted a similar policy of encouraging "the broad-
ening of the base of capital ownership among wider numbers of Dela-
ware citizens, and [encouraging] the use of employee stock ownership
plans as one means of broadening the ownership of capital."' 6 The act
requires certain state agencies to report annually their efforts to comply
with this policy.'
0 7
Michigan
One of the first and most novel state laws to support employee own-
ership, House bill 4119 (H.R. 4119), was enacted in Michigan in 1979.
House bill 4119 pertains only to potentially employee-owned firms in
which at least fifty percent of the employees control the manage-
ment.' 0 8 In other words, H.R. 4119 ensures that employees will have
voting rights, from which management rights spring. Thus, H.R. 4119
would apply to ESOP's that pass through voting rights, as well as to
producer cooperatives.
House bill 4119 requires the Michigan Department of Labor, in co-
operation with the State Department of Labor and the State Depart-
ment of Commerce, to establish a program to develop such employee-
owned businesses. 10 9 The program must be designed to go into effect
when a plant closes or when twenty-five or more jobs are lost due to a
plant relocation."l0 The program obligates the State Department of
Labor to: 1) develop, collect, and disseminate information; 2) evaluate
the feasibility and viability of a proposed employee-ownership plan;
3) provide technical assistance and training in the operation of em-
ployee-owned corporations; 4) promote and coordinate local, state, fed-
eral and private efforts; 5) assist those seeking financial aid; and
6) recommend appropriate legislative or executive actions to enhance
opportunities for employee-owned corporations in Michigan."'
This statute illustrates Michigan's concern with keeping businesses
within the state. Michigan supports employee buy-out attempts to re-
tain businesses that would otherwise close or relocate. The statute sets
105. Id
106. 63 Del. Laws 35 (1981) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 6508(c) (Supp. 1982)).
107. Id
108. 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts 44 (codified at MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. 450.751-.759 (Supp. 1983)).
"Employee-owned corporation" means a business operation the management rights
of which are represented by voting stock which may be owned only by the employees
of the operation, a nonprofit community development corporation, or an employee-
owned stock ownership plan any portion of which is owned by not less than 50% of
the employees. The operation shall be controlled by a board of directors which is
selected by the shareholders on a basis of I vote per shareholder.
109. Id. § 2.
110. Id. §§ 1, 2.
111. Id. § 3.
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out a simple, workable program that gives crucial support to employee
ownership attempts that might otherwise fail. Other states could initi-
ate such a program with ease and minimal cost.
More recently, Michigan adopted the Michigan Economic Develop-
ment Authority Act of 1982.112 This Act established an economic de-
velopment authority to issue bonds, make loans, and provide tax
concessions for various economic development efforts. The Act specifi-
cally allows for loans to employee stock ownership trusts; however, no
loan may exceed fifty percent of the project's cost." 3 This Act, when
combined with H.R. 4119, will greatly aid employee buy-outs where
the employees decide to use an ESOP.
New Jersey
New Jersey's Worker Owned Corporation Study Act of 1981 directs
the state's Department of Labor and Industry to determine the best
means for encouraging and assisting the formulation of employee stock
ownership plans."t 4 The Department of Labor and Industry must then
develop a plan to encourage employee ownership of businesses that
face closing or relocation." 5
Illinois
The Illinois Employee Ownership Assistance Act of 1982 encour-
ages the "employees of plants that are about to close or be relocated to
take over and acquire such plants, and to continue to operate them as
employee-owned enterprises.""' 6 The Illinois Act authorizes the De-
partment of Commerce and Community Affairs to give the employees
technical assistance. Furthermore, the Act provides state loans to em-
ployee ownership associations through the Illinois Industrial Develop-
ment Authority, thus enabling workers to complete acquisitions of
plants after they have obtained at least fifty percent of their funding
from other sources.' No loan from the Industrial Development Au-
thority may exceed fifty percent of the project's cost." 8
112. Michigan Economic Development Authority Act, 1982 Mich. Pub. Acts 70 (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 125.1901-.1934 (Supp. 1983)).
113. Id. § 16(3). This section states:
The Authority may use the money held in the fund to make loans in accordance with
this act for the following purposes:
... (b) To finance industrial facility conversion projects located in a dis-
tressed area for the purpose of financing working capital, if the loan is to an
employee stock ownership trust in which the allocated and unallocated
shares are voted by the plan participants.
114. Worker Owned Corporation Study Act, 1981 N.J. Laws 82 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
34:1B-30 to -35 (West Supp. 1983)).
115. Id. § 5.
116. Employee Ownership Assistance Act, 1982 Ill. Laws 991, § I (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 1301-13 (Supp. 1983)). Section two of this act states that "'Employee Ownership' here
means a business controlled and at least 60% owned by its employees."
117. Id. §§ 4-8(1).
118. Id. § 9(6).
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The Employee Ownership Assistance Act also creates an Employee-
Owned Enterprise Advisory Council composed of seven members. ' 9
The Council provides information and approves loan applications in
conjunction with the Industrial Development Authority. 21 Much like
the Michigan employee ownership acts, this Illinois statute should
greatly facilitate employee buy-outs.
West Virginia
In the 1983 regular session, West Virginia passed Senate bill 659
which allows any manufacturing company to deduct the value of its
ESOP contributions from its state taxes.' 2' Thus, ESOP manufacturing
firms may have little or no state tax liability.
Massachusetts
Massachusetts' unique Employee Cooperative Corporations Act of
1982 is perhaps the most democratic of all the current forms of em-
ployee ownership legislation. 22 The first statute of its kind in the
United States, this law creates statutory authority and legal certainty
for worker cooperatives within the state. Until the Massachusetts legis-
lature passed this statute, the law in Massachusetts regarding worker
cooperatives was unsettled, as it presently remains in most states.
The 1982 law requires a new class of voting stock for members of
worker cooperatives.1 2 3 Although each cooperative corporation may es-
tablish its own criteria for membership, each member may only own
one share of stock.' 24 The Employee Cooperative Corporations Act
limits membership to persons employed by the cooperative and re-
quires that members vote their shares on a one person-one vote ba-
sis. 1"' The new law expressly allows the cooperative to apportion
earnings and losses to members based on the members' work, as mea-
sured by hours, rather than on relative capital investment. 26 The new
law also permits the use of an internal accounting system and a capital
structure appropriate for a worker cooperative. 2 7 The Employee Co-
operative Corporations Act authorizes the internal organizational
structures which cooperatives have long used, but the Act gives cooper-
atives the legal legitimacy they have long lacked.
119. Id. § 5. The seven members are the Lieutenant Governor ex officio, the Director of Com-
merce and Community Affairs ex officio, and five persons active in community service, or-
ganized labor, or the business community.
120. Id. §§ 5(f), 9.
121. 1983 W. Va. Acts. 177 (codified at W. VA. CODE § 11-13-3a (Supp. 1983)).
122. Employee Cooperative Corporations Act, 1982 Mass. Acts 104 § 3 (codified at MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 157A, § 1-11 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1983)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The new law spells out a procedure for such "patronage allocations" that is consistent for
Subchapter T requirements for certain cooperative tax advantages. Subchapter T of § 1381
of the Internal Revenue Code (1980) deals with cooperatives and their patrons.
127. Id.
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This statute clarifies the law regarding cooperatives in Massachu-
setts. The unique arrangement between the worker and the cooperative
does not fit neatly into the traditional notions of labor and manage-
ment that permeate many laws. As cooperatives become an increas-
ingly popular form of employee ownership, it becomes increasingly
important to clarify their economic status in the state.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
For employee ownership to take hold in the United States, the
workers, businessmen, and union leaders will have to be convinced of
its worth. In the absence of support from these groups, the Federal
Government could do little to promote employee ownership. There-
fore, the Federal Government's role in advancing employee ownership
will not determine the future of employee ownership plans. Yet, fed-
eral legislation could contribute to employee ownership in this country.
Open Support of Employee Ownershp
A national policy supporting employee ownership would increase
public awareness of this option and set a clear direction for future legis-
lation. A governmental policy advocating employee ownership would
make legislators who favor employee ownership more successful in
their efforts to promote it. Legislators opposed to employee ownership
might be persuaded to reexamine its concepts. Agencies that inadver-
tently hinder employee ownership might reexamine their regulations in
light of governmental policy. Perhaps other agencies would fund re-
search in this area. Admittedly, policy statements, by their very nature,
often lack any real teeth and have limited effect on actual conditions.
Although a policy statement is a small step, it must be taken in order to
clarify the Federal Government's position on employee ownership op-
tions and potential federal involvement.
Financial Assistancefor Employee Ownershp
Employees of a company facing closing or relocation often have
great difficulty raising the capital necessary to purchase the company.
Loans and loan guarantees would aid employees in this endeavor.
While some programs are available, these programs are often too re-
stricted and underfunded. By providing greater availability of loans
and loan guarantees to employee and community organizations or
groups, the government can avoid considerable costs that follow in the
wake of a plant closing. Through loans the community gains a taxpay-
ing business full of taxpaying employees rather than allowing a plant to
remain idle. Larger loan programs have been proposed in the past but
19841
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have as yet failed to become law.' 28
STATE GOVERNMENTS
State governments stand in a unique position allowing them to en-
act innovative and progressive legislation promoting employee owner-
ship. Their size makes them well-suited to creatively use resources for
advancing the growth of employee ownership. Employee ownership
provides an opportunity for state governments to strengthen their eco-
nomic growth, secure jobs for citizens, and effect a more equitable dis-
tribution of capital.
Increasing Public Awareness
Each state must take several steps to encourage employee owner-
ship. First, state legislators should enact legislation designating em-
ployee ownership as a goal of state economic policy. This legislation
should include a plan to educate the public and improve its under-
standing and awareness of employee ownership options. Second, states
should designate an official or an agency to serve as an objective infor-
mational resource on employee ownership. Third, state Departments
of Commerce should organize meetings to familarize the business com-
munity with various forms of employee ownership and seek their ad-
vice in planning state involvement in employee ownership and
employee buy-outs.
Plant Closing Legislation
. Employees most commonly consider plant ownership as an alterna-
tive to a plant shut-down. Frequently though, employees do not learn
of a plant closing until a few weeks or even a few days before the plant
actually closes. 129 Employee buy-outs become increasingly difficult in
such circumstances, because financing is difficult to obtain with such
short notice. Thus, states should enact pre-notification requirements to
give employees an early warning of at least ninety days of impending
plant shut-downs. 30
After a plant shut-down, parent firms are often unwilling to aid em-
ployees who are attempting a buy-out because they view the employees
128. During the 95th Congress, Congressmen Kostmayer (D-Pa.), Lundine (D-N.Y.), and Mc-
Hugh (D-N.Y.) introduced H.R. 11222 "The Voluntary Job Preservation and Community
Stabilization Act." This bill would have created a $100 million loan fund in the Economic
Development Administration (EDA) to make loans to employees purchasing plants that
would otherwise close or relocate. The EDA would first require a feasibility study before
approving the loan. This study would have to include a plan for repayment of the loan, with
provisions for employee payroll deductions if necessary. The bill would also allow commu-
nity members to participate in ownership. See 124 CONG. REC. 5114-16 (1978). For techni-
cal reasons, the bill died in committee. [95th Cong.] 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH 1978) 28,288.
129. See supra note 7.
130. See Advance Notice of Plant Closings:. Toward National Legislation, 14 U. Mich. JL Ref. 283
(1981).
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as potential future competitors. 13' Such uncooperativeness can only
undercut employees' attempts at purchasing the plant. Thus, states
should facilitate cooperation by requiring firms to negotiate with em-
ployee groups in good faith and to make any financial records neces-
sary for plant operation available to the employees.
Technical Assistance
Owners and employees may be unwilling and unable to spend large
amounts of money to investigate the feasibility of employee ownership
for their plants. By providing free or low cost legal and financial ad-
vice concerning employee-owned business or employee buy-outs, states
will, to their own economic advantage, increase the number of em-
ployee-based businesses. States should grant special assistance to em-
ployees who, faced with a shut-down, are unable to finance private
feasibility studies.
Financial Assistance
Although states continue to trim their budgets, it still makes sound
economic sense for states to support employee ownership. When states
help workers retain their jobs, they reduce the number of workers reli-
ant upon welfare, unemployment benefits, and other temporary help
measures.
States can provide the necessary financial assistance to employee
purchasers through several means. First, states should loan or grant
money as "bridge financing" to aid employee purchasers facing a plant
shut-down between notification of the shut-down and attainment of
purchase financing. These funds will help the employees span a critical
period in their employee ownership process.
Second, states should require companies in dissolution to provide
severance pay to their employees. This provision would only slightly
burden the dissolving company because, having anticipated liquidating
costs from the start, the company would likely have set up an account
to cover the expense. Although financial difficulties precipitate plant
closings, plants are often subsidiaries of large corporations, and thus
have access to adequate capital for severance pay.
The amount of severance need not be large; a suggested standard is
one week's pay for each year the employee has worked for the com-
pany. Should employees wish to pool their severance pay to purchase
the company, then the state, at the request of the employees, should
contribute the unused portion of the employer's unemployment com-
pensation account to the severance pay pool. The employees originally
contributed these funds, so the state would bear minimal additional
costs. The employees would be risking the loss of this money if the
employee-owned company failed, but since they can receive unemploy-
131. Rosen, supra note 20, at 31.
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ment compensation, using this money in attempting to save their jobs
represents a good investment.
Third, states frequently use Industrial Development Bonds (IDB's)
to encourage companies to locate in a certain area. Generally, these
bonds are used only to finance new facilities. Yet, the bonds could
provide a potential source of financing for employee ownership if legis-
lation authorized employee ownership as an activity eligible for IDB
financing. If an employee-owned business were too small to qualify for
an IDB, then the state should allow several small employee-owned
companies to share a single IDB.
Fourth, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's
UDAG program, which makes grants for urban governments in certain
economically distressed areas, has been broadened to include employee
stock ownership. 32 Local governments receive these grants directly
and loan the money to employee-owned enterprises in their locality.
By taking full advantage of this program, states can save considerable
expense in establishing employee-owned enterprises.
Reforming "Blue Sky" Securities Laws
States should exclude employee-owned firms from their "Blue Sky"
securities laws since these laws were designed to ensure that stock pur-
chasers have adequate information regarding their purchase. The
thrust of Blue Sky laws does not apply to the employee stock ownership
situation and compliance with them can be extremely expensive. In
lieu of Blue Sky laws, firms should be required to negotiate with em-
ployee purchasers in good faith, and make financial records necessary
for continuing the company available to them.
Finally, states should make direct or guaranteed loans to businesses
wishing to become employee-owned. These loans should be available
to all types of businesses, but may be restricted to small businesses if
required by state finances. These loans can be financed by general rev-
enues or bond issues.
CONCLUSION
The lopsided distribution of capital in the United States gives to a
few people an enormous amount of power, while leaving others nearly
powerless. One way to affect a more equitable distribution of capital is
through employee ownership of businesses and corporations. Em-
ployee ownership allows workers to own a fraction of their company,
and with it a voice in its management. Employee ownership also
boosts productivity and strengthens relations between workers and
management. The national economy benefits when employees avert
large-scale unemployment in the face of a plant shut-down by purchas-
132. See supra note 90.
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ing their company. The Federal Government and several state govern-
ments have already passed legislation supporting employee ownership.
With broader support, employee ownership can take root in the United
States to benefit working individuals and the national economy.
Timothy G. Merker*
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